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Abstract:
Reference-dependence has been a topic of interest in recent history for the field of
economics. It’s implications that utility is not solely based on outcomes, but rather
how outcomes are interpreted from a previously set expectation has the potential to
effect many aspects of incentive structures. In this research, subjects complete a
real effort task in which they are provided with information that creates shocks in
their expectations. These shocks make the individual readjust to the new
information, impacting performance in the real-effort task. We conclude that
reference-dependence performance is impacted by adjusting reference points that
may have a positive or negative impact on the individual performance, dependent
on the valence of the shock.

Introduction
The field of economics has a vested interest in the decisions and performance of
individuals under different contexts and incentive structures. This interest is founded in the
economists’ attempts to understand the material world through mathematical, scientific and
incentive structures. Due to individuals making decisions on a daily basis, understanding what
affects these becomes increasingly salient. An insightful concept to consider is the setting of
expectations by the individual prior to making a decision. Managing expectations is as much a
life skill as managing a budget. The greater the development of the skill, the successful decisions
may seem.
Managing expectations is crucial in interpersonal relationships and their success. When
expectations are not met, individuals may have a “sour” experience that may have spillover
effects. For example, imagine a worker receiving news at the start of the day that they will be
receiving a 3% bonus to their salary. This is welcomed news to the worker, they are now 3%
relatively wealthier. The next day the same worker is told they were given incorrect information:
the bonus is in fact only an increase of 2%. This new change is now a loss relative to the
previous day. The reference-point is now the larger of the two increases, not their base salary,
even considering that they are still being paid at their original salary. Based on this new
perception, one could expect behavior of the worker to be altered. This paper seeks to test this
particular circumstance, where expectations, serving as reference points, affect performance. Due
to the field not readily providing readily observable moments in which we can test these theories,
we turn to the lab to a controlled setting where we conduct a real-effort task experiment that
involves a shock to expectations in perceived and actual wage rates that will be earned.

This paper is organized in the following manner: Section II summarizes previous
literature on the topic of reference-dependence theory. Section III explains the design and
methodology of the experiment. Section IV addresses the hypothesis of the experiment. Section
V presents the results obtained data analysis. Section VI concludes the research by providing an
analysis on the implications of the results.

II - Literature Review
Reference-dependence research has seen a flourishing period of growth in economic
literature with its foundation based on models stipulating that expectations can act as reference
points (Abeler et al. 2011; Kőszegi and Rabin 2006, 2007, 2009). This is a welcome addition to
economic theory as it helps to further model the world we experience in mathematical terms,
seeking a more concise understanding of ourselves in the world. Drawing inspiration from the
same source as many behavioral economics concepts, reference-dependence is an expansion of
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The understanding that gains, in the same
magnitude, are not equal to losses has expanded the perspective and worldview of researchers in
the field.
The field of reference-dependence must define the concept of a reference point: being
those beliefs an individual held in the recent past about present outcomes (Koszegi and Rabin
2006; Ericson and Fuster 2011). Past experiences lived by an individual create a set of beliefs
that will directly influence expectations of future outcomes. This can directly impact
performance, or even the decision to perform (Farber 2005). If beliefs of the future are strong
enough in one direction to impede progress, the individual will adopt a loss-averse standpoint
and perhaps decide that the utility maximizing decision is to not participate.

In the case that individuals either slow down or stop completely in their activity, research
has found that this is done to meet a reference point they have set previously (Koszegi and Rabin
2006; Abeler et al. 2011; Crawford and Meng, 2011). This rationalization of new beliefs to the
current context and the decision made afterwards, is dependent on how this change is presented.
If the change was unexpected, individuals are less likely to continue in their activity. The
contrapositive is true as well; when changes are expected, and even accounted for in previous
moments, individuals find themselves being more likely to continue in the activity (Koszegi and
Rabin 2006, 2007; Chang and Gross 2014).
The decision to not perform or work harder when facing higher prospects, relative to
expectations, has been proven to hold over different settings (Farber 2005; Koszegi and Rabin
2006; Crawford and Meng 2011; Chang and Gross 2014). This is best explained in the research
put forth by Chang and Gross (2014): in a pear packing farm, workers faced expected or
unexpected shocks to their wages for most days of the week. They knew that they must work the
entirety of their shifts but did not know the duration of it until the start of the day. If the daily
shift exceeded 8 hours, they were paid overtime wages for every hour above the threshold. This
is thus an unexpected change for which they must adapt and rationalize their decisions. Weekly
hours were more predictable, as the week progressed workers are able to know how many hours
are necessary to exceed the 40 hours before overtime pay would go into effect. When the shock
was unexpected, workers decreased effort. When it was expected, they increased effort. This is in
line with all previous theory on the matter where unexpected shocks alter held beliefs of
outcomes, changing expectations which then influence effort and performance in a task.
Individuals act in a loss averse manner when they are in a context of expected outcomes (Ericson

and Fuster 2011); they trend towards their established status quo which is easier to rationalize
and requires little cognitive cost to establish.
Cognitive costs find themselves in the center of this theory. The science of heuristics,
promulgated into academia through the many works of Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky and
their many colleagues in the field, have helped to rationalize the irrational behavior we
experience; relative to the homo economicus we assume operates the world. Gigerenzer and
Brighton (2009) provide the term Homo Heuristicus which has a biased mind and is arbitrarily
selective of which information they are interpreting. This specimen satisfices rather than
maximize. This individual would rather work less under unexpected higher wages, minimizing
costs and satisficing their utility. The theory of cognitive load explains the theoretical existence
of an accuracy-effort trade-off that individuals are assumed to conduct.
There are many industries in which an accuracy-effort trade-off is made by the
individual. This naturally leads to there being interest in many different fields on the behalf of
researchers. Reference-dependence performance or effort provision has been widely studied in
taxi cab drivers’ decision to work more during higher implicit wage times (Farber 2005;
Crawford and Meng 2011), effort exerted by pear packers (Chang and Gross 2014), live game
attendance for athletic events (Coates et al. 2014), Major League team relocations and
expansions (Humphreys and Zhou 2014), on the game of political communication transparency
with constituents (Grillo 2016), supervisor leniency in performance appraisal (Marcheginani et
al. 2016), marathon runners (Allen et al. 2017), investment speculation and speculative bubbles
(Zhang and Zheng, 2017).

This research fits in the present literature by providing an analysis on how endogenously
determined expectations affect performance when individuals undergo a shock to their beliefs. It
contributes to the field of reference-dependence by measuring and comparing empirically the
performance of individuals when their expectations of wage shocks are met or not. To the best
knowledge

of this researcher, this is the first paper to analyze the effects of

reference-dependence on performance directly. Many previous studies deal with the matter of
effort provision, this paper does not measure provision but rather focuses on performance and
accuracy on a menial task.
This paper is organized in the following manner: Section II explains the design of the
experiment as well as the methodology. Section III addresses the hypothesis of the experiment.
Section IV discusses the results obtained through data analysis and its discussion. Section V
concludes the research by providing an analysis on the implications of the results.

Section III - Experiment Design
The experiment involved a real effort task that had two parts. Each part was timed for 3
minutes in duration, totalling 6 minutes for the entire effort task. Subjects were informed by the
sound of a bell that 30 seconds remained to complete the part. The task itself involved
identifying how many times a given number in a 4x4 grid repeated itself. The grid had a string of
randomly generated numbers and was limited to digits between 3-9 to ensure that the sought
numbers would appear in non-arbitrary quantities. There were a total of 108 grids per page, in a
total of 12 pages totalling 108 grids in each part. In order to obtain credit for identifying the
correct number of times a number appears in a grid, subjects had to write the exact amount of
times in the space provided below. A correct answer was true only if the number was accurate,

any other form of answering was counted as inaccurate and did count towards the subjects
earnings.
To begin the experiment, the researcher read the instructions to the subjects after they had
signed the consent form and decided to participate. They were informed that their payment
would be dependent dependent on their performance during the session, and they would be
receiving a participation payment of $1.50. This might appear to be a low rate of compensation
for the participants. However, the entirety of the session lasted 20 minutes maximum. Subjects,
on average, would earn above $15 per hour so it is the belief of the researcher that they were
properly incentivized to perform and were compensated appropriately.
The subjects were informed prior to the beginning of the first part that they would receive
“slightly more/less” per correctly answered grid during the second part, depending on which
treatment was presented. This was done to incite the creation of expectations regarding possible
wages earned. They were reminded of this change in wage rate after part one was completed.
They then completed a demographic survey that asked basic demographic information and some
reference-dependence related questions. When beginning the second part, the subjects were told
to carefully read the instructions as they may be searching for a different number, which was true
for a majority of the treatments; this was done to ensure a randomization of the treatments. The
second part also had information regarding the wage rate shock they were experiencing. The
treatments involved informing the subject that they could have, or will be earning more/less than
they were receiving in the second part. For example, it would have read that they could have
earned up to $0.08 but will be receiving $0.07 per correct grid. Subjects in another positive

treatment would have only read that they will be receiving $0.07 per correct grid. This is an
intentional effort to create a shock in “status quo” wage rates that the subjects had internalized.
The entirety of the subjects that participated in the experiment were students from
Portland State University. The students were informed that their participation was voluntary and
had no bearing on their grades for their class, as well that they would be paid in cash at a later
date. The treatments were presented in the second task and were the following:

Treatment Number

Explicitly Shown

Actual Payment

1

Could have earned $0.04

Earned $0.05

2

Will be earning $0.05

Earned $0.05

4

Will be earning $0.07

Earned $0.07

5

Could have earned $0.08

Earned $0.07

6

Will be earning $0.04

Earned $0.04

7

Will be earning $0.08

Earned $0.08

Section IV - Hypothesis
The principle hypothesis for this experiment is that subjects who experience the treatment
that informs them of the possibility of having earned a different wage rate will perform at a
different rate than those who are aware of only their wage rate; through the way of an example,
subjects that are informed they could have earned $0.08 but will be paid $0.07 will perform
differently than subjects that were only informed they will be paid $0.07 This originates from the
understanding that unexpected shocks to wage may affect performance in negative ways (Chang
and Gross, 2014). Due to all subjects experiencing an identical first task, they all experience the

same expectation creation method when informed that the second part will vary. This ensures
that differences in outcomes in the second part are properly controlled for and not biased in any
significant way. At the moment that the participants are informed their wage rate will be altered
in the second part of the experiment, they are generating expectations on what this could be. Due
to the language used in informing them of this wage shock, they create a personal amount;
having interpreted “slightly more/less” as they will.
Section V - Results
Over the course of two weeks, we were able to collect 172 data points, the breakdown of
these for each treatment was the following: 34 observations for treatment 1; 34 observations for
treatment 2; 34 observations for treatment 4; 28 observations for treatment 5; 21 observations for
treatment 6; 22 observations for treatment 7. Because the experiment had both a positive and
negative treatment, each one of these had a different outcome. But both failed to reject the
hypothesis. In figure 1, the means of the outcomes are visualized and are statistically significant
for treatment 1, 4 and 6. This is saying that when individuals saw they could have earned lower,

as in the case of treatment 1, they performed better relative to the individuals who were just
shown the same wage rate earnings (treatment 2).
That is, their expectations were submitted to a shock that informed them they could have earned
less than they did, triggering some internal process that rationalized a sense of positive gain
making them perform better. We argue the contrapositive occured in the positive treatment 4,
relative to treatment 5 and 7. Individuals who were shown only the wage rate, rather than the
possible wage rate performed at a higher rate due to not knowing they could have possibly
earned more. Individuals in treatment 5 initialized some form of an endowment effect. This
materialized as they felt they lost possible wages and thus performed worse than individuals who
earned the same wage rate but whose expectations were met. Treatments 6 and 7 are,
respectively, the negative and positive extremes. In these we see an income effect take hold in
where individuals earning more performed less, as is the case of treatment 7. Treatment 6 did
perform statistically significantly more in the second round, as predicted by the established
theory.

Figure 2 allows for an easier visualization of the differences between performance in the
tasks. Specifically, treatments 1, 4 and 6 show larger differences between parts 1 and 2. A small
difference is already expected due to learning effects in the subjects, which is presented as the
small increases visible in treatments 2, 5 and 7.

Figures 3 and 4 provide the distributions for each treatment. Figure 3 has the distributions
for the negative treatments, and Figure 4 shows the distributions of the positive treatments. Most
notably, we see that in Figure 3, treatments 1 and 6 (in green and blue respectively) have very
similar distributions. The potential and actual loss experience there produces an equal
performance in subjects, where they both perform more. In Figure 4, the inverse is true, where
treatments 5 and 7 have similar distributions but show less performance than treatment 4. This
can be largely attributed to an income effect (for treatment 7) and loss aversion taking hold of
performance (for treatment 5). Treatment 4 only saw an increase, with no other information
affecting their perceived expectations on their earnings.
The results above provides us with results stipulating that it is better for performance to
under-promise under positive changes. That is to say, if employers are able to increase wages, it
is better to provide accurate information that will set expectations correctly. If changes are made
that will be perceived as positive, it appears that individuals seek accurate gains rather than
possibly inaccurate promises, where not meeting expectations is harmful for performance. If
changes are perceived as negative, it appears that it is more beneficial for performance when
individuals see a larger loss than they are incurring, perhaps internalizing some sort of survivor
bias or heuristic. In essence, informing individuals that their reality is better off.
Section VI - Conclusion
This research sought to understand how presenting individuals with possible wage rate
changes and submitting these to shocks that make them differ, can affect performance in a real
effort task. Having conducted an effort-task that extended two parts, in which the second part
had different possible wages only being explicitly known once beginning the task, we conclude

that individuals performance can be positively/negatively affected by expectation shocks,
dependent on the direction of the shock. When individuals were shown they could have earned
less than they were being compensated, they showed better performance relative to those
individuals who only saw the actual loss in wages. In the positive realm, individuals who saw
they were earning less than was possible performed worse than those who were only made aware
of how much they will effectively be earning. These results are attributed to loss-aversion and
reference-dependence theory seeing as how they fall in line with expected behavior for
loss-averse individuals, as they favor or performed better in treatments in which they could have
experienced more losses or were not made aware they could have earned more (which is still a
loss through an endowment effect). Those who saw minor losses relative to possible ones,
internalized that they are actually gaining, even though holistically it was a net loss. Those who
saw minor gains, underwent an endowment effect that made them feel losses when they were in
fact net gaining.
This is important in the realm of labor markets as employers may affect the performance
of workers if they do not properly understand incentive structures and the expectations that are
inherent in these. It may not always be prudent to over promise a gain if the expectations of this
will not be met.
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